ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE

 

This week, US and Israeli forces launched massive attacks against Iran resulting in the death of Iranian dictator Ayatollah Khomeini. Iran has launched retaliatory strikes all over the region and revenge strikes here in the US are almost a certainty given the abilities of Hamas and other Iranian linked terrorist organizations known to have a significant presence in the US.

Churches are particularly vulnerable due to their symbolic value and lack of security measures as compared to government targets. While vehicle, arson, explosive and chemical attacks are all possible, an active shooter attack is probably still the method of choice for lone wolf actors and small radicalized groups.

Unfortunately, most of the active shooter training provided by government and local law enforcement sources is woefully inadequate and tainted by political considerations which strongly discourage armed response and high level civilian training. The most common models presented are usually variants of the now discredited “Run, Hide, Fight” philosophy. The text below is an AI summary of criticisms of “Run, Hide, Fight” with my comments inserted in italics.

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“The "Run, Hide, Fight" active shooter response model is criticized for being too linear, inflexible, and potentially dangerous, as it may lead victims to run into danger, hide in vulnerable, trapped locations, or fight without training. It ignores the natural human response to freeze, lacks context-specific situational awareness, and may not work for children or in all scenarios. 

“Major Problems with "Run, Hide, Fight"

• Linearity and Inflexibility: The model implies a rigid, sequential, one-size-fits-all approach that doesn't allow for, or encourage, quick reassessment of changing, dynamic situations.

• "Run" Risks: Running can sometimes lead individuals directly into the assailant's path, or cause injury that makes them an easier target. (The RHF model was designed for government agencies, high schools, colleges and other institutions which assume a high percentage of mobile people. Churches are filled with babies and children, elderly and physically challenged people for whom running is not an option. The RHF model makes no provision for these people. THAT IS NOT A MORALLY AN ACCEPTABLE PLAN FOR CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS.)

• "Hide" Limitations: Hiding (sheltering in place) can turn a room into a trap, making individuals sitting ducks if the attacker finds their location.

• "Fight" Reality: Telling untrained civilians to fight can result in death, as they lack the necessary training or experience to effectively counter a deadly threat. (This assumes that the attacker will be given the advantage of first strike, that victims will be unarmed and that some casualties are inevitable. Some official videos actually encourage victims to mass attack the shooter with their bodies or throw heavy objects.” )

• Ignores "Freeze": The model assumes logical action, but many people naturally freeze in panic during unexpected violence, a biological response not accounted for.

• Not Suitable for All: It may not be applicable or safe for children, especially young students, to engage in combat. 

Alternative Models and Considerations

• Situational Awareness: Experts suggest focusing on real-time awareness rather than rigid, pre-set actions.

• Prepare-React-Recover (PRR): A more comprehensive model suggested to improve upon the limitations of the traditional approach.

• Move! Escape or Attack!: A simplified, proactive alternative that emphasizes immediate movement away from danger or, if necessary, aggressive action. 

Experts generally recommend tailored, flexible training that empowers individuals to assess their specific environment rather than blindly following a three-step protocol.”

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RHF training offers many institutional advantages that appear attractive to bureaucrats while offering little in the way of real protection. It can be completed in one class and requires little if any organizational investment in time, training and re-organization of standing policies. It is politically correct and avoids hot button issues like armed civilians and civilian response training which in the past have frightened many politicians, bureaucrats and even church officials more than the active shooter threat itself.

The most problematic issue with RHF is that it assumes there will be no preventive measures to stop the attack before it starts and the only armed response will come from law enforcement. Given that the typical law enforcement response time in the US is between five and ten minutes in urban areas and may run much longer in rural areas, this gives the shooter plenty of time to shoot until he runs out of ammo or gets tired of killing and then flee the scene before police arrive.

The Oklahoma Church Security Association recommends a flexible plan based upon the individual church’s capabilities. It starts with high level situational awareness training for all church greeters, ushers and staff encouraging them actively look for warning signs and keep the trouble outside if at all possible. It continues with what we call the “Three R’s” approach.

The first R is report. The church should have at least two designated communicators seated in protected areas who have been trained to make a coherent, organized 911 call to get law enforcement and other emergency services started on the way.

The second R is remove. Greeters, ushers and staff should be trained in how to remove the congregation away from the threat whenever that is possible. If the system is working properly, the threat will be isolated to a particular area of the facility. People not in that immediate area should be evacuated away from the threat scene while the armed response team deals with the situation. Greeters, ushers and staff should be not only directing traffic but also directing assistance for those unable to move quickly by themselves.

The third R is respond. Every church should have a small, law enforcement level trained armed response team capable of facing an active shooter and at minimum keeping them isolated until law enforcement arrives.

The “Three R’s” approach is not an easy fix that can be taught in a one day pancake breakfast/security seminar. The basic training itself takes several sessions and must be refreshed constantly to keep the team members current. The initial armed response training may take months and requires constant practice and updating. And, everybody needs to train together. For the “Three R’s” to work it all has to happen at once, everybody has to know their job and be able to perform it under a level of stress they have probably never experienced before in their lives. That takes serious training.

The OCSA does not provide stand alone active shooter training nor stand alone armed response training. Our program takes several months and is geared toward producing church teams capable of not only saving lives in an active shooter situation but also professionally handling the hundreds of constantly recurring smaller security issues that all churches must address.

For more information about OCSA training respond to this email or contact Bill Kumpe at 918-381-9792.